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Honorable Willie l. Brown, Jr . , Speaker of the Assembly 
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Dear Mr. Speaker and Members: 
In May 1983, Assemblyman Richard Katz requested the Assembly Office of 
Research to investigate the feasibil i ty of a regional water trading project 
within the San Joaquin Valley. With funding from the Cal i fornia Policy 
Seminar and the Public Service Research and Dissemina~ion Program, 
researchers from the University of Ca l ifornia at Davis and Hastings College 
of law worked under Assembly Office of Research supervision to answer the 
following questions: 
t How much water is available for trade? 
• Do existing conveyance systems have the capacity to trade the 
available water? 
1 What are the economic benefits to sell ers and buyers? 
1 Do legal problems stand in the way of a trade agreement? 
Using as an example a hypothetical water trade between severa l water 
districts, the researchers found that 153,486 acre-feet of water cou d be 
traded at a price that would result in substantial profits to the sel l ers 
and savings to the buyers, without any adverse effects. 
By way of comparison, this amount of water represents approximately 31 
percent of the yield of the proposed "Through Delta Facility of 1984." 
Such a trade would cost importers on ly about one-half as much per 
acre-foot, and no additional construction would be required. 
Existing conveyance structures are adequate to handle the volume of 
water and the legal analysis found that state and federal statutes and 
water district contract provisions would allow the trade. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently enacted legislation encourages water users to sell, lease or 
trade water without losing their appropriative rights, provided that 
others• rights, the local economy and the ecology are not adversely 
affected. This report examines the economic feasibility and legal 
requirements of a hypothetical trade from two San Joaquin Valley irrigation 
districts to the water districts comprising the Kern County Water Agency. 
Background 
A growing amount of research suggests that voluntary trades of water 
among water rights holders can result in more efficient uses of water, 
benefiting both sellers and buyers, as well as the state's economy. 1 This 
research culminated in legislation that cleared the way for voluntary 
Gary D. Weatherford, et al., 11Market Reallocation, Market Proficiency, 
and Conflicting Social Values, .. Western Water Institutions in A Chanain~ 
Environment (December 1980), in a report to the National Science Foun at1on 
from the John Muir Institute, to be published by Westview Press. 
Charles E. Phelps, et al., Efficient Water Use in California: Water 
Rights, Water Districts, Water Transfers (The Rand Corporation, R-23 
86-CSA/RF, November 1978). 
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trading of water and water rights, but several questions have been raised 
concerning the economic practicality, the technical feasibility, and the 
legality of such water trades. 
The 1978 Governor•s Commission Report 
In December 1978, the Governor's Commission to Review California Water 
Rights Law reported: 
Just as the drought of 1976-77 focused the attention of 
Californians on our sources of water and available means 
for conserving these sources, it served also to high-
light the principal strengths and weaknesses of the 
state's water rights laws .•.. Jt provided an excel-
lent opportunity for California to respond to the 
invitation issued by the National Water Commission in 
1973 to the states to modernize the law in order to 
'secure greater productivity, in both monetary an~ 
nonmonetary terms, from existing water supplies.' 
The report found that the water allocation system which had evolved 
from the gold rush days contained several inefficiencies that arise from 
the difficulties in transferring water rights among places of use, points 
of diversion, or purposes of use. The "use it or lose it" philosophy of 
appropriative rights was seen as encouraging inefficiency. 
The Commission recommended making water rights more secure and endorsed 
the concept of increasing efficiency by modifying impediments in present 
law to make water more easily traded. 
,., 
LGovernor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, 
Final Report (P.O. Box 100, Sacramento, California, Oecember 1978). 
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The 1980 Rand Report 
In May of 1980, a report published by the Rand Corporation, entitled 
Efficient Water Use in California: Water Supply Planning, recommended a 
change in the pricing structure of the state's water supplies and revisions 
in the law to allow individuals and public agencies to have clear title to 
the waters they use. 3 
The 1982 Assembly Office of Research Report 
In February 1982, the Assembly Office of Research (AOR) reported the 
results of a survey of Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley water rights 
holders concerning their willingness to participate in voluntary sales, 
leases, or exchanges of water. This report, A Market Approach to Water 
Allocation, showed that 19 percent of the water rights holders responding 
were willing to participate, and that at least 172,173 acre-feet would be 
available for such transactions. 4 In addition, the survey indicated that 
even more water rights holders might consider participating in a water 
market if certain changes were made in state law. 
3Efficient Water Use In California. 
4Assembly Office of Research, A Marketing Approach to Water Allocation, 
Sacramento, February 1982. 
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The 1983 Env;ronmental Defense Fund Report 
In March of 1983, the Environmental Defense Fund investigated the 
potential for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) 
to obtain additional Colorado River water by financing water conservation 
investments for the Imperial Irrigation District (IID). This report, 
Trading Conservation Investments for Water, documented that substantial 
amounts of Colorado River water, possibly as much as 438,000 acre-feet per 
year, could be conserved by IID and used elsewhere without significantly 
impairing present agricultural production within IID.5 The study indicated 
it would be both legally permissible and economically advantageous to both 
MWD and its customers and liD if they were to enter into an equitable 
agreement to salvage some of the water now lost. 
Reaction to Proposals for Reform 
The Governor's Commission report and the Rand report were sharply 
criticized as being impractical and infeasible by groups such as the 
Association of California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau 
Federation, and the California Chamber of Commerce. The Department of 
Water Resources issued a critique of the Rand report which stated that the 
11major, and probably insurmountable. obstacles to the implementation of a 
water transfer system as envisioned in the RAND report. at least on a 
statewide level ••. is the resistance to such a concept in the water-rich 
5Environmental Defense Fund. Trading Conservation Investments for 
Water, Berkeley, (March 1983). 
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northern areas of the state."6 In addition, these proposals have been 
criticized as providing an opportunity for depriving a region of its 
livelihood, raising the specter of the fate of the Owens Valley. 
The Legislative Response 
Despite these criticisms, the Legislature enacted proposals to revise 
existing law. In 1979, Senator Vuich introduced legislation (Chapter 1112, 
Statutes of 1979)7 which protects water rights from forfeiture when someone 
fails to use all or any part of the water due to conservation efforts. 
Water conservation was defined to include water savings resulting from land 
fallowing or crop rotation. In 1980, Assemblyman Filante introduced 
AB 1147 (Chapter 933, Statutes of 1980)8 which provides a procedure for 
temporary and long-term transfers of water or water rights. 
In 1982 Assemblyman Katz, responding to the findings of the AOR survey 
of water rights holders, introduced AB 3491 (Chapter 867, Statutes of 
1982)9 which provides greater protection and security of water rights wh~n 
holders sell, lease, or exchange their water. This legislation further 
provides that: 
6Ronald B. Robie, Director, Department of Water Resources, Statement 
of the California De~artment of Water Resources, presented to the Assembly 
Committee on Water, arks, and Wildlife at its Special Hearing on the RAND 
Report, (May 14, 1980, in Sacramento, California), p. 3. 
7 
·water Code, Division 2, Sections 1010 and 1011. 
8water Code, Division 1, Sections 100.5, 109, Division ? commencing 
with Section 1210, Chapter 10.5 commencing with Section 1725. 
9water Code, Division 1, Section 109 and Chapter 3.6 commencing with 
Section 380. 
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1 A water rights holder who has conserved water may sell, lease, or 
exchange the conserved water without relinquishing the right to it 
1 local water agencies may sell, lease, or exchange water, as long as 
the water trade does not harm any legal user of the water, does not 
unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area or fish and 
wildlife, nor adversely affect other beneficial instream users 
t Water districts and agencies may act as brokers for individual water 
rights holders 
1 The Department of Water Resources, the State Water Resources Control 
Board and other state agencies are required to encourage voluntary 
trades of water and must provide technical assistance to persons to 
identify and implement water conservation measures which would make 
additional water available for trade 
t The depletion of an area's water supply, such as occurred in the 
Owens Valley, is specifically prohibited; the sale of water is 
allowed while protecting a region's rights. (Thus, the amount sold 
and the duration of the sale are always under the control of the 
water seller. For example, interruptible contracts to allow for 
drought contingency can be drafted in the same way as those used to 
sell natural gas and other resources.) 
Colorado River Users Response 
Despite previous skepticism, both the Imperial Irrigation District and 
the Metropolitan Water District have recently committed staff resources and 
time to the examination of obtaining additional water supplies from the 
Colorado River which are now lost due to irrigation spillage and seepage. 
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On January 24, 1984, the Board of Directors of IID passed Resolution 
No. 8-84 which reversed a previous position that any conserved water would 
have to be used on IID lands and instead invited other Colorado River water 
contractors in California and other possible recipients of any conserved 
water to meet with them to discuss conservation opportunities including 
cost and method of paymenf. 
In December 1984, the District Board of Directors considered a proposal 
by Parson's Corporation of Pasadena to eliminate irrigation spillage and 
seepage in return for an annual percentage fee based on the income the 
district would receive from marketing the conserved water to other 
agencies. Consideration of this proposal to have a private corporation 
carry out the work took place after liD's special water committee in 
ongoing negotiations with MWD had reached an oral agreement in 
November 1984 that called for MWD to contribute money to a conservation 
fund to be set up by IID. 10 
More recently, the MWD reported approximately 350,000 acre-feet per 
year could be saved at a unit cost ranging from $20 per acre-foot to $115 
per acre-foot. In addition to conservation opportunities with IID, MWD is 
also examining the feasibility of additional trades with the Coachella 
Valley Water District and ground water recovery and conservation gains from 
lining the All American Canal •11 
10carl Boronkay, General Manager, Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California, to the Board of Directors, "Prospects of Obtaining 
Additional Colorado River Water for the Metropolitan Water District," 
January 4, 1985. p. 9. 
11 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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Unanswered Questions 
While recent reforms in state law have made it easier for districts to 
engage in voluntary sales and trades, four important questions should be 
answered if these statutory reforms are to be fully and effectively 
implemented. These questions, which guided the research reported in the 
following chapters, are discussed below. 
How Much Water Is Available for Trade? 
In necember of 198?., the Oepartment of Water Resources conducted its 
own survey of water right holders north of the ~elta in order to establish 
data for a drought year agricultural water purchase program. Approximately 
4 percent of the respondents indicated a possible willingness to 
participate, and 15 percent said they definitely would be willing to sell, 
lease, or exchange their water. 12 Unfortunately, because the department 
transferred funds from this project in 1983-84, follow-up on the positive 
responses never took place. The amount of water which could be made 
available for trades is, therefore, unknown. 
What Benefits Might Accrue to Sellers and Buyers? 
The sellers of water may have to forego some uses and/or production as 
a result of not having the water they sell, or they may have to alter their 
cropping patterns to accommodate the drop in water supply. Sellers will, 
therefore, need to establish a volume and price that more than offsets any 
12Robert R. McGill, Department of Water Resources, Northern District 
Senior Land Water Use Analyst, to Patricia Schifferle, Assembly Office of 
Research. 
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loss they may sustain and recover profits foregone. Conversely, buyers 
will have to obtain increases in their incomes to pay for the new water. 
Buyers may therefore decide to alter production practices to take advantage 
of the new water by producing more profitable crops or decrease existing 
costs for current crop production by reducing expensive ground water 
pumping. Will a trade agreement result in an economic advantage for both 
buyers and sellers, and if so, how much? 
Are Possible Water Trades Physically Feasible? 
If a buyer and seller agree to trade a specified number of acre-feet, 
are the conveyance systems in place to make the trade and are their 
capacities sufficient? How much will the transportation costs add to the 
cost of the transaction? These questions should be answered for a specific 
water trade proposal in order to perform a realistic assessment of 
technical feasibility. 
What Legal Problems Stand in 
the Way of a Water Trade Agreement? 
The Assembly Office of Research survey found that water right holders 
were reluctant to participate in exchanges and trades because they were 
unsure of the security of their water rights and were concerned about 
possible effects on downstream users or third parties. Other reports have 
asserted that changes in the law might be necessary for such trades to 
proceed. At the very least, a proposed trade should take into 
consideration the situational or site specific constraints upon the water 
rights and the contracts of the districts involved. Accordingly, this 
study examines applicable state law, the rules and regulations and 
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contracts of the districts involved in the hypothetical water trade to 
discover possible legal impediments that might prevent these districts from 
participating in a sale or lease of their water. 
Study Purpose 
When the Department of Water Resources changed its funding priorities, 
it became apparent that it would not be able to complete the work required 
to answer some of these important questions. At the same time, the debate 
over transferring additional water from the Sacramento River to the pumps 
in the southern Delta was renewed in the legislature. Accordingly, 
Assemblyman Richard Katz requested the Assembly Office of Research to 
investigate the prospects of a regional water trading project within the 
San Joaquin Valley as a more economically viable alternative. Specifi-
cally, the study was to examine the economic impacts to both the importing 
and exporting districts, the physical feasibility of water trading, and the 
legal prohibitions or implications that might affect such a trade. 
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CHAPTER2 
HYPOTHETICAL CASE STIJDY 
Study Methods 
Because the answers to the questions posed on the preceding pages will 
depend on the circumstances of a specific water trading agreement, we 
decided to do research on actual water districts believed to be likely 
buyers and sellers. The methods we used are discussed below. 
Selection of Export and Import Districts 
We selected two water districts as the 11 exporters 11 and one water agency 
consisting of 21 different member districts as the 11 importers. 11 The 
possible exporting districts (the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts) 
were selected because these districts have ample water supplies, even under 
drought conditions; the importing agency (the Kern County Water Agency) was 
chosen because the seven detailed analysis units have, in the past, 
required additional water and have been willing to purchase additional 
supplies. 13 
13There are 21 member agencies which belong to the Kern County Water 
Agency. The reference here to seven component districts relies on the 
Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 214 which suggests that, for 
analysis purposes, these districts can be grouped into seven detailed 
analysis units because of regional similarities. 
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University of California Participation 
We sought and received funding commitments from the Public Service 
Research and Dissemination Program and the California Policy Seminar to 
provide research assistance to answer the economic and legal questions. 
Funds were used for these research activities under the supervision of 
Dr. Richard Howitt and Dr. Charles Moore at the University of California at 
Davis and Brian Gray at the Hastings College of Law. 
Importing and exporting district staff were contacted at the outset of 
this study, but did not choose to commit district resources to participate 
in this pilot investigation. 
The results of this study and the conclusions in this report should not 
be construed as an endorsement of an actual transaction by any of the 
districts or agencies selected for study, nor should the study results be 
interpreted as an intent on the part of these districts to engage in such a 
trade. 
Computer Simulation 
Because we could not study the implementation of a real water trade, we 
relied on recently developed techniques that use historical and current 
data to simulate many of the complex interactions that would occur in the 
type of transaction we hypothesized and to generate the likely results of 
these interactions. The primary tool was the Department of Water 
Resources' hydrologic-economic model of the San Joaquin Valley, 14 which can 
14oepartment of Water Resources, The Hydrologic-Economic Model of the 
San Joaquin Valley, Bulletin 214, Sacramento, December 1982. 
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be used to predict changes in water use and crop production as a result of 
changing economic conditions and water supplies within specified ground 
water and surface water delivery constraints. 
Several components of the department's hydrologic-economic model were 
used in this study and modified to predict changes resulting from the 
hypothetical agreement among the selected water districts. 
Detennin;ng the Amount of Water to be Traded 
The Department of Water Resources' hydrologic-economic model was 
modified in two ways to produce an estimate of the amount of water that 
could be made available for trade if both the importing and exporting water 
districts were to maximize their economic gains. First, only the nine 
"detailed analysis unitS" out of the total of 33 DAUs in the Department's 
model were used for our study. 15 Secondly, to determine if there was a 
quantity of water which, if traded, would benefit both the importing and 
exporting districts, demand and supply curves were developed for the water 
districts in the nine DAUs, based on several assumptions. 16 
15While the San Joaquin Valley contains over 250 water agencies, only 
' 54 of them are considered by DWR to be major agencies. These 54 agencies 
were combined into 33 detailed analysis units {DAUs) for the purposes of 
DWR's study. 
16The amount of irrigable land was fixed and it was assumed that no 
additional ground water would be pumped in the exporting area after the 
water was traded. Only consumptive water use would be traded; the value in 
use of the water in Kern County was based on ground water pumping costs and 
imported water could be used to displace ground water pumping. Trades 
would continue as long as the price plus transportation costs were less 




The San Joaquin Valley Production Model, which simulates farming 
decisions based on actual crop reports, farm production costs, and prices 
received for crops, was used to estimate demand functions for water for 
each study DAU. 17 Each demand equation for the seven Kern County DAUs was 
adjusted to reflect transportation costs. The demand equations for Turlock 
and Modesto were used to develop implicit supply functions for the seven 
Kern County DAUs. 
The derived demand and supply functions were used to find the 
equilibrium free market price and quantity that satisfied the aggregate 
supply and demand equations. This "optimizing" model generated both the 
quantity of water and the price that each district would have to trade to 
achieve the maximum total economic benefit--the sum of benefits for buyers 
plus sellers. 
Detenn;ning Feasibil;ty and 
Cost of Moving the Water 
The department•s "network" model, which determines the evaporation 
losses for all channels, canals, ~d rivers, and calculates the losses and 
gains from subsurface flows for all rivers, was used to identify the 
sources, uses, and losses of surface water as it moves among the DAUs to 
calculate a set of water quantities which could be traded and to calculate 
the associated pumping costs. 18 
17oepartment of Water Resources, Bulletin 214. 
18Ibid. 
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Projecting Changes in Production 
The quantities of water and prices paid for them, calculated as 
described above, were then entered into the San Joaquin Production Model to 
simulate the resulting changes in crop production in each of the 
participating districts. 
limitations of the Simulation Model 
Like all mathematical models, the techniques used to study the 
hypothetical water trade cannot take into account the full range of 
constraints which apply in real marketplace decisions. The information 
presented here provides a reasonable estimate of what would occur if the 
assumptions of the model are accurate. Other social and political 
considerations may also affect a district•s or farmer•s decision to 
participate in sales, leases, or exchanges of water. These variables were 
not considered. The analysis performed by the University of California 
researchers was designed to maximize the sum of the net benefits to 
exporters and importers--in other words, the model was impartial in the 
division of benefits between exporters and importers. It is possible, 
however, that exporters could bargain with individual users of imported 
water to receive a larger share of the benefits depending upon other 
variables. This analysis does not examine these variations in market 
conditions. 
To provide information that will be relevant to a wider range of 
possible water trade agreements (in addition to the mathematically 
11 optimum 11 solution), we have varied the constraints of the model to show 
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the results when less water than specified by the 11 0ptimization 11 model is 
traded. 
Assessing the legal Constraints on Vater Trading 
Examination of the legal implications and economic changes which may 
result from any specific sale, lease, or exchange of water provides all 
parties with additional information to evaluate the potential for a market 
approach to allocation of water resources. Existing law recognizes the 
potential complexity of such decisions by providing for temporary water 
trading mechanisms whereby such shifts may be examined before contemplating 
longer contractual agreements. The results of Brian Gray's detailed 
analysis of the federal and state statutes, regulations, and contractual 
obligations affecting the hypothetical water trade are presented in the 
final section of this report. 
Study Results 
Amount of Water to be Traded 
The model that optimizes economic gains to both exporting and importing 
districts revealed that 153,486 acre-feet of water could be profitably 
traded between the selected study districts at a base price of $38.78 per 
acre-foot in the Delta. Due to different transportation costs, each 
importer would pay a different price, depending upon location along the 
aqueduct, but all would receive water below the price they are currently 
paying for pumped water. Table 1 shows the economic effects on all 




Economic Effects of Trading 
153,486 Acre-Feet at $38.79 per Acre-Foot 
Price Lost 
Per Acre- Export Value 
Acre- Foot Water of 
Sellers Foot Sold Revenue Cro~s 
Modesto Irrigation District $35.27 83,982 $3,257,182 -$1,776,159 
Turlock Irrigation District $37.74 69,504 $2,695,726 -$1 ,384 '186 








Savings per Foot Net 
Buyers Acre-Foot Bought Gain 
DAU 
254 Kern Delta WD, Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD $ 3.54 14,671 $ 51,935 
255 Semitropic WSD, Buena Vista WSD $ 6.74 33,673 $ 226,956 
256 North Kern WSD, Shafter-Wasco ID 
South San Joaquin MUD $15.25 30,019 $ 457,789 
258 Arvin-Edison VSD, Wheeler Ridge-
Maricopa WSD (part) $21.88 15,632 $ 342,028 
259 Be 1 ridge WSD. Berrenda Mesa VD. 
Lost Hills VD $ 6.62 15,579 $ 103,133 
261 Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD (part) $27.50 43,913 $1,207,607 
TOTAL 153,486 $2,389,453 
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The quantities to be traded are substantial even if relatively small 
when compared to the total water rights and water contract agreements in 
both the exporting and importing areas--2.3 million acre-feet19 in the 
importing regions and 1,051,846 acre-feet20 in the exporting region. The 
trade of 153,486 acre-feet represents substantial economic gains. Total 
benefits to the economy would exceed $5.2 million per year if water were to 
be traded from lower valued uses to a higher valued use in an area where 
water is more scarce. Annual net returns to importers and exporters would 
be $2.4 million and $2.8 million, respectively. (See Table 2). Any 
negotiations between exporters and importers could redistribute these net 
gains in different proportions, depending on the relative bargaining power 
of the two groups. Additional benefits that were not considered in this 
study include increases in power production in the exporting districts and 
improved habitats for fish and wildlife. 21 
For comparison purposes, if the 153,486 acre-feet were to be traded to 
Kern County at the prices indicated, this would amount to approximately 
31 percent of the yield of the Through Delta Facility proposed in 1984 by 
the California Department of Water Resources. But this trade would cost 
the importers approximately one-half as much per acre-foot, and no 
additional costly construction would be required. 
19Kern County Water Agency, 11 Water Supply Report, 11 1983. Figure 7 
p. 38. This figure represents the estimate of water used by the crops and 
does not include return flows. 
20state Water Resources Control Board, Direct Diversions for Modesto 
Irrigation District and Turlock Irrigation District, 1984. This figure 
represents direct diversions by the two districts and does not include 
ground water extraction in 1984 of 197,077 acre-feet. 
21Department of Water Resources, San Joaquin District, Lower Tuolumne 
River Water Use, 198~ . 
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. Table 2 
BENEFITS TO EXPORTERS 
AND IMPORTERS FROM 
WATER MARKET TRADING 
Stanislaus County 
153,486 acre ft. 
Kern County 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
Exporters 
Avg. Market Value: $36.35 
Avg. Value in Use.. 20.56 
Net Benefits $15. 76/acre ft. 
Importers 
Avg. Value in Use 






Net Profit $2,792.563.00 Expenditures $2,389,453.00 
*Price includes average transportation and pumping costs. 
**The value in use of the water was based on the production model utilizing 
current water and changing crop pattern. This is a weighted average of 
values in use ranging from $3.52 per acre foot to $38.79. 
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Feasibility and Cost of Moving the Vater 
Application of the Surface Water Allocation Model (SWAM) showed how 
water could be traded from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts in 
Stanislaus County {DAUs 206 and 208) to the Kern County DAUs (See Figure 1). 
The Modesto Irrigation District (DAU 206) would divert less water from the 
Stanislaus, the Tuolumne and/or San Joaquin Rivers (junctions 1, 2, 4, 12, 
and 14). The Turlock Irrigation District (DAU 208) would decline diversions 
from the Tuolumne, the Merced, and the San Joaquin (junctions 7, 12, 19, and 
21). Additional water would, therefore, flow via the San Joaquin into the 
Delta (junction 8). From there the water would be moved via the California 
Aqueduct (junctions 24, 25, 110, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 99, 100, 
101, 102) and the Cross Valley Canal (junctions 99, 98, 97, 68) to most of 
the Kern County DAUs {254, 255, 256, 258, 259, ?.61). Because this system 
does not serve the districts in DAU 257, those districts can obtain 
additional water by paying for Delta water sent to DAUs 256 and to 258 in 
exchange for the latter's allocation of water from the Friant-Kern Canal 
(junctions 40, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). 22 
Transportation costs vary, depending on the location of the importing 
district. It costs the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts nothing in 
operating costs to allow water to flow past their diversion points and into 
the Delta. However, the cost of transporting water along the California 
Aqueduct, as shown by Curie (1983) 23 (see Table 3), is significant. 
22such exchanges already take place among DAUs 256, ?.57, and ?.58. (See 
Assembly Office of Research, Marketing Approach to Water Allocation (1982). 
23M. M. Currie, "The California State Water Project: Ana lyti ca 1 
Description of Water Allocation, Water Pricing: Conditions for Market 
Formation and Market Activity," Ph.D Thesis, University of California, 
Da v i s , 1983 . 
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Districts located in DAUs 254, ?55, and 259 must pay the costs associated 
with the Banks and Dos Amigos Pumping Plants: $5.43 + $?..39 = $7.82 per 
acre-foot. Districts in DAU 261 must pay an additional charge for the Buena 
Vista Pumping Plant: $7.82 + $4.32 = $12.14 per acre-foot. Likewise, the 
districts comprising DAUs 256, ?.57, and 258 must pay the additional pumping 
charges associated with the Cross Valley Canal: $7.82 + $10.10 = ~17.92 per 
acre-foot. 24 
Table 3 
Pumping Costs Associated wi t h the ~pathetical Water Trade 
Reach nunit rate•a •cu~lative 
Number Name of Plant $/AF Rate $/AF 
1 Banks Pumping Plant 5.43 5.43 
4 Dos A.igos Pumping Plant 2.39 7.82 
14A Buena Vista Pumping Plant 4.32 12.14 
15A Wheeler Ridge Pumping Pl ant 4.46 16.60 
16A Mind Gap Pumping Plant 10.34 26.94 
17E Edmonston Pumping Plant 37.26 64.20 
29E Oso Pumping Plant 4.87 69.07 
29G Warne Powerplant 12.83 56.24 
29J Castaic Powerplant 4.76 31.48 
afigures are rounded to the nearest hundredth. 
Source: Curie. (1983) 
24Robert K. Davis, Office of Policy Analysis, United States Department 
of the Interior, personal communication to Tom Gossard University OT 
California, Davis, Post-graduate Research Assistant, Agricultural Economics, 
September 1984. 
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Changes in Crop Production 
The transfer described in this study could be accomplished with minimal 
changes in cropping patterns and total water use in each area. Table 4 
shows the effects on each crop as a positive or negative percentage. 
Table 5 shows the overall changes in crop acreage for the importers, 
exporters, and the entire San Joaquin Valley. The exporting region would 
reduce irrigated acreage by 8 percent, and this reduction would take place 
largely in irrigated pastures. Since irrigated pasture does not use 
significant quantities of purchased inputs--such as fertilizers, machinery, 
pesticides, and labor--there are minimal secondary impacts on the local 
economy. The loss in income to the local economy would be offset by the 
increased local income from the water trade. 
Table 4 
Changes in Crop Pttterns Resulting from Proposed 
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Alternati ve Vater Trading Scenarios 
We also examined the economic effects of restricting to 100,000 acre-
feet the amount of water traded or increasing it to 200,000 acre-feet. For 
100,000 acre-feet, the benefits to the exporter would fall by 57 percent to 
$1.2 million, and the benefits to the importer would fall by 36 percent to 
$1.5 million. The sum of importer and exporter benefits would be reduced 
48 percent to $2.7 million (Table 6). Thus, the exporters forego substan-
tial profits, and the importers are denied the cost savings from the addi-
tional 53,486 acre-feet of water that the original model solution allocates 
for trade. However, there would still be $1.6 million in potential profits 
that could go to either the sellers or the buyers depending on the 
bargaining power of each party in the negotiations. Alternatively, 
$1.6 million could be assigned to the public treasury raising statewide 
benefits to $4.3 million, which is still a decrease of 17 percent from the 
value estimated for the market equilibrium quantity of 153,486 acre-feet. 
Any increase in water traded above 153,400 acre-feet would lead to the 
voluntary sale price exceeding the value of the water to importer. Thus, 
quantities traded in excess of the amount identified by the original model 
are unlikely because the value to the exporters would exceed the value to 
the importer plus the cost of the trade. Clearly, trades would not take 
place under these conditions without subsidized prices or extra 
reimbursement for transportation costs. 
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Table 6 
Economic Effects of Tra~ing, 
100,000 Acre-Feet at $26.12/42.18 per Acre-Foot 
Price Acre- Export Lost 
Per Feet Water Value Net 
Sellers Acre-Foot Sold Revenue of Cro2s Gain 
Modesto Irrigation District $22.60 53,823 $1,405,658 -$ 797,458 $ 608,200 
Turlock Irrigation District $25.07 46,177 $1,206,054 -$ 627,225 $ 578,829 
TOTAL 100,000 $2,611,712 -$1,424,683 $1,187,029 
Net Acre-
Savings per Feet Net 
Buyers Acre-Foot Bought Gain 
DAU 
254 Kern Delta WD, Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD $ 0.15 633 $ 95 
255 Semitropic WSD, Buena Vista WSD $ 3.35 16,723 $ 56,022 
256 North Kern WSD, Shafter Wasco ID, 
South San Joaquin MUD $11.86 23,341 $ 276,824 
258 Arvin-Edison VSD, Wheeler Ridge-
Maricopa WSD (part) $18.50 13,209 $ 244,366 
259 Belridge WSD, Berrenda Mesa WD, 
Lost Hills VD $ 3.23 7,598 $ 24,541 
261 Wheeler Ridge~aricopa WSD (part) $24.11 38,496 $ 928,138 
TOTAL 100,000 $1,529,986 
aThe price and costs are for the sellers ($26.12) and the buyers ($42.18). The 
difference ($16.06) times the quantity traded (100,000) gives the additional profit 
($1.6 million) that could be realized by either the sellers or the buyers. 
-30-
Conclusion 
A trade of water from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation districts to the 
Kern County Water Agency is physically possible and economically beneficial 
to both the importers and exporters. The quantities indicated by the 
models are large enough to be attractive to the importers, but small enough 
(9.5 percent) so as to have a minimal effect on the agricultural practice 
of the exporters. The questions about legal impediments are answered in 




LEGAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING EXPORT OF WATER FROM 
MODESTO AND TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 
In this section, we outline the scope of Modesto Irrigation District's 
(MID) and Turlock Irrigation District's (TID) authority to enter into the 
water trade described above. We then analyze the rules and regulations of 
the two districts to determine whether they contain any additional 
limitations on the authority of the districts. 
California law 
Statutes Affecting Irrigation Districts 
The Irrigation District law, Division 11 of the Water Code, governs the 
administration of the two exporting districts. Pursuant to Water Code 
Section 22228, the districts "may contract to perform and perform any 
agreement with any number of persons or public corporations or agencies for 
the exchange, transfer, or delivery . . • of any water right or water." 
This authority is supplemented by Section 22259, which provides: 
If its board deems it to be for the best interests of 
the district, a district may enter into a contract for 
the lease or sale of any surplus water or use of surplus 
water not then necessary for use within the district, 
for use either within or without the district. 
Although the Irrigation District Law does not specifically define the term 
"surplus water," other provisions of the Water Code make it clear that the 
determination of whether a surplus exists is left to the discretion of the 
districts. 
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Effect of Recent Amendments to the Vater Code 
The water trading provisions of the Irrigation District Law were 
recently supplemented by the 1980 and 1982 amendments to Division 1 of the 
Water Code. The purpose of these amendments is set forth in Section 
109(a), which declares that it is "the established policy of this state to 
facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights where 
consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and the place of 
import." The decision to engage in a water trade is left primarily to the 
participating agencies, rather than to any state agency. The role of the 
SWRCB, as discussed later, is limited to the protection of downstream users 
and instream uses potentially affected by the water trade. Thus, 
Section 382 of the Water Code provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every local 
or regional public agency authorized by law to serve 
water to the inhabitants of the agency may sell, lease, 
exchange, or otherwise transfer water that is surplus to 
the needs of the agency's water users for use outside of 
the agency. The authority granted to local and regional 
public agencies by this chapter shall not be construed 
as prohibiting or restricting the transfer of water or 
water rights pursuant to authority granted such agencies 
by provisions of law other than this chapter. 
The second sentence of Section 38? makes it clear that this section 
supplements, and does not restrictively amend, the water transfer 
provisions of the Irrigation District Law. 
The determination of whether the exporting agency has water "surplus to 
the needs of the agency's water users" also is left to the discretion of 
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the local water agency, rather than to any state agency. 25 According to 
Section 383 of the Water Code: 
For purposes of this chapter, water that is surplus to 
the needs of the agency's water users shall mean any of 
the following: 
(a) Water, to which the right is held by the 
agency pursuant to an appropriation made under the Water 
Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing with 
Section 1000), which the agency finds will be in excess 
of the needs of water users within the agency for the 
duration of the transfer. 
(b) Water, to which the right is held by the 
agency pursuant to an appropriation made under the Water 
Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing with 
Section 1000), of which any water user agrees with the 
agency, upon mutually satisfactory terms, to forego use 
for the duration of the transfer. 
(c) Water, to which the right is held by a water 
user within the agency pursuant to an appropriation made 
under the Water Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing 
with Section 1000) where the water user and the agency 
agree, upon mutually satisfactory terms, that the water 
user will forego use for the period of time specified in 
the agreement and that the agency shall act as agent for 
the water user to effect the transfer. 
25The Legislature emphasized its general deference to local or regional 
decisionmaking in Section 380 of the Water Code, which provides: 
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows: 
(a) The various regions of the state differ widely 
in the availability of water supplies and in the need 
for water to meet beneficial uses. 
{b) Decisions regarding operations to meet water 
needs can depend in part upon regional differences. 
(c) Many water management decisions can best be 
made at a local or regional level, to the end that local 
and regional operational flexibility will maximize 
efficient statewide use of water supplies. 
(d) The authority granted by this chapter to local 
and regional public agencies ••• is in furtherance of 
the policy declared in Section 2 of Article X of the 
California Constitution and in Section 109." 
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Thus, for the purpose of allowing a trade of water between TID or MID and 
the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA), a water surplus for post-1914 
appropriative filings would be deemed to exist if: (a) the board of 
directors of either district found that the district possessed water in 
excess of the needs of its own users; or (b) individual users within the 
district agreed to forego the use of a portion of their entitlement during 
the period of the water trade. 
The trading agency is not entirely exempt from the requirements of 
state law, however. For example, Section 384 provides: 
Prior to serving ~ater to any person for use outside the 
agency, the agency shall comply with all provisions of 
the general laws of this state relating to the transfer 
of water or water rights, including, but not limited to, 
procedural and substantive requirements governing any 
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose 
of use due to such transfer. 
The Major Constra;nt on Vater Trades 
The primary substantive constraint on water trades is that changes in 
the purpose of use, point of diversion, or place of use may not diminish 
the amount of return flow to the injury of existing downstream users, 
whether they be junior or senior to the exporting agency. This prohibition 
is well established in the common law and statutory law of California and 
is applicable both to pre-1914 and post-1914 water rights. 26 Section 386, 
26water Codes Sections 1700, 1701, 1702; see also Section 386 
(post-1914 rights); id. Section 1706 (pre-1914 rights); City of 
San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 28-29 (1921). 
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which applies only to water rights acquired after December 19, 1914, 
authorizes the SWRCB to approve a water trade "only if it finds that the 
change may be made without injuring any legal user of the water and without 
unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses 
and does not unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from which 
the water is being transferred." 27 
Application to the Hypothetical Vater Trade 
The prohibition against a change in the purpose of use, point of 
diversion, or place of use causing harm to downstream users and instream 
uses poses no significant constraints for the water trade outlined in this 
study. The most efficient means of conveying water from TID and MID to 
KCWA would be through the California Aqueduct. Thus, water now used in the 
two districts for irrigation would be bypassed and allowed to flow down the 
Tuolumne River into the San Joaquin River and on to the Delta. The water 
would then be diverted from the Delta at Clifton Court Forebay and pumped 
south to KCWA through the California Aqueduct. Thus, instead of diminish-
ing flows and reducing instream uses downstream from the districts, the 
trade actually would augment the existing flow of the lower Tuolumne River 
and the San Joaquin River. Accordingly, the water trade would not adversely 
affect any downstream users and could provide enhanced water quality 
benefits to these users, as well as enhancing instream uses by increasing 
the fresh water flow of the lower Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers. 
27The procedures governing selections to change the purpose of use, 
point of diversion, and place of use of water appropriated pursuant to an 
existing water right are set forth in Water Code Sections 1700 through 17~6. 
The role of the SWRCB in administering these procedures is discussed below. 
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Downstream Users• Rights Limit 
the Amount Available for Trading 
The rule protecting downstream users does point up, however, an 
important limitation on the quantity of water the districts may transfer to 
KCWA. Users downstream of TID and MID, whether junior or senior in 
priority to the districts, have the right to appropriate for their own 
purposes that portion of the water diverted by the districts but returned 
to the Tuolumne Piver following the districts' use. 28 The rights of 
downstream users to this return flow may not be impaired by the trade of 
water to KCWA. Thus, following the water trade, downstream users may 
continue to divert as much of the upstream runoff as they did at the time 
of the trade. Accordingly, the amount of water that TID and ~ID may trade 
to KCWA will be less than that which the districts do not divert and allow 
to pass downstream. The quantity available for trade will be limited to 
the amount of water diverted and consumed by TID and MID (i.e., evapo-
transpiration). The amount would be further reduced by any transportation 
losses such as deep percolation or evapotranspiration. The remainder--the 
quantity diverted but returned to the Tuolumne River in the form of 
runoff--must remain available in the river for use by downstream users to 
the extent of their current rights to such runoff. 29 
28 Water Code, Section l?O?(d). 
?.9see generally Clifford T. lee, The Transfer of Water Rights in 
California (Sacramento: Governor's Commission to Review California Water 
Rights Law, December 1977) pp. 31-36. Staff Paper No. 5. 
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Other Conditions and Limitations in State Law 
Two other provisions of the Water Code define the scope of the 
districts' authority to trade water to KCWA. First, Section 385 provides 
that "no water may be transferred pursuant to this chapter for use within 
the boundaries of a local or regional public agency that furnishes the same 
water service to the transferee without the prior consent of that agency." 
Thus, TID and MID could not sell water to individual users within the 
service area of KCWA without the approval of the agency. 
Second, Section 387 of the Water Code generally limits the duration of 
water trades made pursuant to Sections 382 and 384 to a period of seven 
years. If the water traded is "made available as a result of •.. water 
conservation," as defined in Section 1011, however, the trade may continue 
"for such period of time as may be agreed upon by the agency and the 
transferee." 30 
Section 1011(a) defines "water conservation" as: 
••• the use of less water to accomplish the same 
purpose or purposes of use allowed under the existing 
appropriative right. Where water appropriated for 
irrigation purposes is not used by reason of land 
fallowing or crop rotation, the reduced usage shall be 
deemed water conservation for purposes of this section. 
The potential water trade presented here would involve water made available 
from existing uses within TID and MID as a result of diminished 
consumption, land fallowing, and crop rotation. Accordingly, the surplus 
would consist of water "made available as a result of water conservation" 
30water Code Section 387. 
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within the meaning of Sections 387 and 1011. The general seven-year time 
limit set forth in Section 387 would, therefore, not be applicable.31 
District Rules and Regulations 
The rules and regulations governing TID and MID do not limit the water 
trading authority granted to the districts by state law. The Rules and 
Regulations Governing the Distribution of Water in the Modesto Irrigation 
District (1950) do not address the subject of water trades. The Rules and 
Regulations Governing the Distribution of Water in the Turlock Irrigation 
District (1975) do not directly discuss the trading of water out of the 
district, but de contain a few provisions that might be considered relevant 
to the subject. 32 
For example, Rule 3 provides that "only land suitably prepared for 
irrigation shall receive water." Rule 8 states that "no irrigator shall 
be entitled to a greater amount of water for irrigation than he can 
31The Irrigation District Law and regulations promulgated thereunder 
provide that any contract for the sale of water for a period of more than 
three years must be approved by the State Treasurer. Water Code 
Section 22260; 10 Cal. Adm. Code Section 1858; see Water Code 
Sections 20001 and 20002. It is not clear whether this requirement is 
applicable to transfers of water by Irrigation Districts pursuant to 
Sections 380 through 387 of the Water Code. 
32Paragraph 16 is entitled the "Rule Regulating the Transfer of Water," 
but it deals only with intra-district transfPrs rather than transfers out 
of the district. Paragraph 16 provides in relevant part: 
Parcels of land under the same ownership when farmed by 
the owner or rented to a single renter may transfer 
water under his allotment from one of his parcels to 
another; or, he may transfer water to land he rents to 
another from land he owns; also, from land he owns to 
land he rents from another; but, he cannot transfer any 
water from rented land to his own land. Water is not 
transferable from one rented parcel of one ownership to 
any other rented parcel of another ownership. 
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economically and beneficially use without waste." Finally, Rule 15 limits 
the supply of water delivered to the members of TID in normal years to four 
acre-feet per acre. Members may obtain additional water only if the TIO 
Board of Directors determines that a surplus exists. 
State Law Supersedes District Rules 
that Might Restrict Water Export 
Because these district rules govern the rights of individual TID 
members only, they cannot be construed as limiting the power the Water Code 
grants to trade surplus water to KCWA. The rules might be interpreted as 
restricting the authority of individual members of TID to sell a portion of 
their water allotment because the rules imply that water will be supplied 
to the members of TID only for irrigation of their own land. This 
interpretation would be invalid under state law because it dirP.ctly 
conflicts with Sections 381 and 383 of the Water Code. Section 383 
empowers the members of local water agencies such as TID to forego the use 
of water allotted to them and, with the consent of the agency, to trade 
this water to other users. According to Section 3P.1, this authority "shall 
control over any other provision of law which contains more stringent 
limitations on the authority of a particular public agency to serve water 
for use outside the agency, to the extent those other laws are inconsistent 
with the authority granted herein." 
Inasmuch as the rules and regulations governing TID do not expressly 
address the authority of district members to sell surplus water, they do 
not conflict with state law. The few rules discussed above that might be 
interpreted as affecting the members' authority to trade water must be 
interpreted so as to conform with state law. Accordingly, consistent with 
-41-
Section 381, those rules do not limit the ability of the members of TID to 
sell watPr to KCWA pursuant to the terms of Section 383. 
Legal Provisions Affecting the Kern County 
Vater Agency's Importation of Water 
The authority of the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) to purchase water 
from TID or MID is governed by California water law, the agency's enabling 
legislation, and its contracts with DWR and the individual member units of 
the agency. 
California law 
Under Section 385 of the ~later Code, TID or MID is prohibited from 
selling water to industrial members of KCWA without the agency's approval. 
Kern County Vater Agency Act 
The KCWA was established by special act of the Legislature "primarily 
for the purpose of acquiring water supplies for its member units."33 The 
agency's enabling legislation, the Kern County Water Agency Act, is set 
forth in Chapter 99 of the Appendix to the commercial compilation 
(West's Annotated California Codes) of the Water Code. 
The act grants the agency ample authority to purchase water from TJD or 
MID. Section 4 empowers KCWA "to do any and every lawful act necessary in 
order that sufficient water may be available for any present or future 
33stat s. 1961, ch. 1003, p. 2652, Section 1. 
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beneficial use or uses of the lands or inhabitants within the agency." The 
authority to enter into contracts and "to do all acts necessary for the 
full exercise of its purposes and powers .. is conferred in Section 3.6. In 
addition, Section 4.3 specifically empowers the agency "(a) to appropriate 
and acquire water and water rights ••• and (d) to import water into the 
agency and to conserve and utilize ... water for any purpose useful to 
the agency or the member units thereof ... Finally, Section 4.4 provides: 
The agency shall have the power within or outside the 
agency to construct, purchase, lease, or otherwise 
acquire works and to purchase, lease, appropriate or 
otherwise acquire water and water rights useful or 
necessary to make use of water for any purposes 
authorized by this act. 
Department of Water Resources Contract 
KCWA now purchases almost all of its imported water supply from the 
Department of Water Resources, which operates the State Water Project. Its 
contract with the department neither prohibits KCWA from purchasing water 
from other sources nor requires it to request water in addition to its 
contractual entitlement from DWR before obtaining water elsewhere. Thus, 
nothing in the agency•s contract with DWR would prevent the agency from 
purchasing water from TID or MID in addition to its State Water Project 
supply. 34 
34Two other provisions of KCwA•s contracts with its member units--
Articles 12(c ) and 19(b) -- will be discussed later. 
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Kern County Wat er Agency Member Unit Contracts 
As with the rules and regulations of TID and MID, KCWA's contracts with 
its member units do not directly address the subject of water trades. 
Article 5(b) of the contracts, however, could be construed as limiting the 
agency's ability to purchase water from TID or MJo. 35 
Requ;rement to Augment Member Unit Supplies 
Article 5 defines each member unit's annual entitlement to water. 
Article 5(b) authorizes a member unit to request water in addition to its 
annual entitlement and requires that "to the extent possible and necessary 
the Agency shall meet such requests for additional water by purchasing 
surplus water from the State." 
35KCWA is required to purchase specified quantities of water each year 
from DWR; these annual quantities are listed in Table A of the contract. 
According to Section 33(a): 
The Agency's failure or refusal to accept delivery of 
project water to which it is entitled under Article 6(b) 
shall in no way relieve the Agency of its obligation to 
make payments to the State as provided for in this 
contract. The State, however, shall make reasonable 
efforts to dispose of any water made available to but 
not required by the Agency and any net revenues from 
such disposal shall be credited pursuant to Article 21. 
Thus, if the Agency's purchases from TID or MID were to reduce its demand 
for SWP water below the quantities listed in Table A, the Agency might be 
required to continue payment to DWR for the water not taken. Section 7(a) 
of the contract provides that KCWA may request D~!R to reduce the quantities 
listed in Table A. DWR may grant this request if the "financial 
feasibility of the project facilities" would not be impaired. 
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The contracts thus impose a duty on KC~IA to use its best efforts to 
augment existing supplies in order to meet the deman~s of its member units. 
Article S(b) requires the agency to purchase such water from DWR. This 
language might be interpreted as requiring KCWA to attempt to purchase 
State Water Project water before it could buy water from TID or MID. It 
would be more reasonable, however, to interpret the terms of Article 5(b) 
as simply embodying the assumption that D~!R would be the primary source of 
KC~~·s water supply and that the agency would direct its requests for 
additional supplies to DWR, as well. Indeed, a contrary construction of 
Article S(b) would be inconsistent with the KCWA's contract with DWR, 
which neither prohibits the agency from procuring water from other sources 
nor requires it to purchase water in addition to its annual entitlement 
from DWR if such water is available. Moreover, in view of Water Code 
Section 109(b), which directs DWR "to encourage voluntary transfers of 
water," it would be difficult to argue that Article S(b) of KCWA's 
contracts with its own member units grants DWR the right to insist that the 
agency satisfy the additional demands of its member units only from State 
Water Rights water. 
Additional Questions Concerning the Legal 
· Complicat;ons of Vater Trading 
While state law and district and agency rules and contracts do not 
prevent a trade, there are several other questions that affpct the 
implementation of this transaction. These questions and their answers 
follow: 
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Could the Trade be Arranged Between 
Individual Members of TID or MID and KCWA? 
The Agency May Act as A Broker 
As discussed above, Section 383 of the Water Code defines the methods 
by which a local water agency may determine that surplus water exists, 
which it then may trade to other users. 36 If the water right is held by 
the agency, the agency itself may conclude that a certain portion of its 
water is surplus to the needs of the agency as a whole. 37 Alternatively, 
the agency and individual users within the agency may decide that those 
users have surplus water, which may be traded without affecting the water 
allotments of other users within the agency. 38 If, on the other hand, the 
water right is hPld by individual users within the agency, those users and 
the agency may agree that the users possess surplus water, which the 
individual or agency may trade on behalf of the users. 39 In each case, the 
agency, rather than the individual users, may act as the broker of the 
water. 40 
36water Code Section 383. 
37water Code Section 383(a). 
38water Code, Section 3P3(b). Transfer of individual water users' 
allotments could not have been possible without the 1982 amendment to the 
~later Code. Under the Irrigation District Law, no water allotted to a 
member of ah irrigation district may be assigned by the allottee for any 
use outside the district. Water Code Section 22251; Jenison v. Redfield, 
149 Cal. 500 (1906). 
39water Code Section 383(c). 
40Where the rights to thP water being transferred are held by 
individual users rather than the agency, Section 383(c) specifies that "the 
agency shall act as agent for the water user to effect the transfer only 
where the agency and individual agree." 
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Alternative Ways of Arrang;ng the Water Trade 
Thus, the proposed trade in this study could be structured with TID or 
MID in one of three ways. First, the district itself could decide to trade 
water to which it holds appropriative rights. The district would determine 
that it possesses water in excess of the needs of its members generally anc 
trade some or all of the surplus to KCWA or its member units. Second, the 
district and certain of its individual members could agree to trade water 
to which the district holds appropriative rights and of which the 
participating members agree to forego the use during the term of the trade. 
Third, the district and certain users within the district could agree to 
trade water to which the users hold appropriative rights and of which the 
participating users agree to forego the use during the term of the trade. 
In this last situation, the district essentially acts as a broker on behalf 
of the users that participate in the trade. 
Distribution of Revenues 
Because the districts are prohibited by California law from earning a 
profit,41 net revenues received by TID or MID must be distributed to the 
individual members of the district. Under the first alternative discussed 
above--where the district trades surplus water to which it holds 
appropriative rights in trust for all of its members--the most equitable 
method of distributing net revenues would be through a general disposition 
to all members of the district. Under the second and third alternatives--
which involve the trades of individual members' allotments of water or of 
41see Phelps, Efficient Water Use in California, p.8. 
-47-
their own rights--th~ most equitable method of distributing profits would 
be to 1 imit the distributions to those members of TID or MID that 
participate in the trade. 
Fewer Restr;ct;ons on Purchas;ng Agenc;es 
While Section 383 requires in specified situations that the districts 
be parties to the kinds of trades just discussed, there is no equivalent 
requirement with respect to the purchasers of the water. Thus, KCWA may 
buy water from TID or MID for distribution to its members units, or certain 
member units (or their own water users) may purchase water directly from 
Tin or MID if KCWA approves and such a trade meets any contractual 
limitations between KCWA and its members or users. 42 
42As discussed previously, ~rater Code Section 385 would require TID and 
MID to obtain the consent of KCWA before the districts could sell water to 
individual users within the agency's service area. 
Tn addition, two provisions of the agency's contracts with its member 
units are relevant to the member units' authority to purchase water from 
TID or MID. 
First, according to Article 19(b) of the contract, if a member unit's 
purchases were to reduce its demand for State Water Project water supplied 
by KCWA below the amount to which the member unit is entitled under its 
contract with the agency, it, nonetheless, would be obligated to pay for 
the unused water under the terms of the contract. The agency is required, 
however, to "make reasonable efforts to dispose of any water made available 
to but not required by the Member Unit and, to the extent of the Member 
Unit's obligation, rto credit1 any net revenue from such disposal •.• to 
the Member Unit." Article 19(b). 
Second, the purchase of water from TID and Min could affect the 
obligation of participating member units to pay the surcharge imposed by 
Article 15 of the contract for State Water Project water used on "excess 
land." Article 15(c ) provides in relevant part: 
11 In the event that the Member Unit or water user 
cowingles project water with water from another source 
in a common distribution system, the Member Unit shall, 
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What Is the Role of the State uater Resources 
Control Board with Respect to the Water Trade? 
As discussed previously, the principal authority to determine whether 
to trade water to KCWA is vested in TID and MID. This authority is not 
exclusive, however. Section 384 of the Water Code directs that: 
prior to serving water to any person for use outside the 
agency, the agency shall comply with all provisions of 
the general laws of this state relating to the transfer 
of water or water rights, including, but not limited to, 
procedural and substantive requirements governing any 
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose 
of use due to such transfer. 
42 (footnote continued) 
in complying with the provisions of this Article, and on 
behalf of the State of California, adhere to the 
following rules: 
(1) If the amount of nonproject water applied in any 
year within the area served with project water by the 
Member Unit is equal to or greater than the amount of 
water put to use on all excess land within that area 
during such year, it shall be presumed that the water 
put to use on such excess land is nonproject water, and 
there shall be no surcharge to water users in that area. 
(2) If the amount of nonproject water applied in any 
year within the area served with project water by the 
Member Unit is less than the amount of water put to use 
on all excess land within that area during such year, it 
shall be presumed, for the purpose of determining the 
payments to be made under the surcharge by water users 
in that area, that the amount of project water put to 
use on excess land of a particular ownership within that 
area during such year bears the same proportion to the 
total amount of water so used on that excess land during 
such year as a total amount of project water applied 
within that area during such year bears to the total 
amount of water applied within the area during such 
year." 
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The SWRCB is charged with enforcing these procedural and substantive 
requirements. 43 
SWRCB Approval Required 
The proposed trade would alter both the existing point of diversion and 
place of use of the water sold to KCWA. The point of diversion would be 
moved from the districts• diversion works along the Tuolumne River to 
Clifton Court Forebay in the Delta, and the place of use would be the 
service area of KCWA rather than the service areas of TID and MID. 44 Thus, 
before the districts could sell water to KCWA, they would have to apply to 
the SWRCB Board to modify the point of diversion and place of use 
provisions of the permits and licenses for such water. 45 The board (or the 
districts if the board so orders) must give notice of the application, and 
persons potentially adversely affected by the proposed trade may protest. 46 
If a protest is filed, the board must conduct a hearing on the proposed 
trade. 47 
43The board has jurisdiction only over appropriative rights that were 
acquired after December 19, 1914, the effective date of the Water Commission 
Act of 1913. The board does not have specific jurisdiction over pre-1914 
appropriative rights. Water Code Section 1706 provides that the point of 
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of water appropriated pursuant to 
pre-1914 rights may be changed 11 if others are not injured by such change ... 
lhis leaves the courts as the forum of first instance to consider injury 
allegations, if any are made. 
44 See p. 21, supra. 
45water Code Section 1701. This requirement is applicable only to water 
the appropriative rights to which were acquired after December 19, 1914. As 
discussed above in note 25, the board has no jurisdiction over the transfer 
of water held pursuant to pre-1914 rights. 
46water Code Section 1703. 






In considering whether to approve a proposed change in the place of use, 
point of diversion, or purpose of use, the board is guided by the standards 
set forth in Water Code Section 386, which authorizes the SWRCB to: 
approve any change associated with a transfer ••. only 
if it finds that the change may be made without injuring 
any legal user of the water and without unreasonably 
affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial 
uses and does not unreasonably affect the overall 
economy of the area from which the water is being 
transferred. 
SWRCB Approval of the Trade Would Be Likely 
As documented in the foregoing analysis, the sale of water from TID or 
MID to KCWA would generate a combined net annual economic gain of 
$5.2 million per year, which would be distributed to the various parties to 
the trade. In light of this economic gain, such a trade would likely not 
be construed as "unreasonably11 affecting the economy of the Turlock-Modesto 
area. Moreover, as discussed above, the water trade could benefit instream 
uses and improve downstream water quality of the Tuolumne and San Joaquin 
Rivers, because any water traded would augment the flow of those rivers. 48 
In view of these factors and the Legislature's directive to the SWRCB "to 
encourage voluntary transfers of water," it appears likely that the boar~ 
would approve the changes in th~ point of diversion, place of use, and 
purpose of use associated with the proposed trade. 
48 See p. 18, supra. 
Would the Water Trade Jeopard;ze 
the Water R;ghts of TID and MID? 
TID and ~In (or individual members participating in the water trade) by 
entering into the trade proposed in this study would not jeopardize their 
• water rights. State law very clearly precludes the forfeiture of the 
rights to the water that might be sold to KCWA. 
The Irrigation District Law states that "nothing in this article 
authorizes the sale of any water right." 49 It also provid~s that "no right 
in any water or water right owned by the district shall be acquired by use 
permitted under this article." 50 Thus, if the districts were to sell water 
to KCWA, invoking their powers under the Irrigation District Law, Sections 
22261 an~ 22262 would preclude any claim that they had traded not just 
water, but also their water rights. 
The 1980 and 1982 amendments to the Water Code also clearly distinguish 
between the transfer of water and the transfer of water rights and allow 
for the sale of water without the concomitant transfer of the rights to the 
water. Although the 1980 amendments declare it to be "the established 
policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and 
water rights," 51 the 1982 amendments authorize only the transfer of water. 
Section 382 empowers local water agencies to "sell, lease, exchange, or 
otherwise transfer water that is surplus to the needs of the agency's water 
49water Code Section ???61. 
50water Code Section 22262. 
51water Code Section 109(a). 
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users 11 ; Section 383 defines 11 surplus water, 11 but nowhere discusses surplus 
water rights. 52 Most important, Section 387 states that transfers 
conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 1982 amendments must be for a 
fixed period of time, generally seven years. 53 Thus, selling water to 
KCWA, TID and MID would not convey any rights to the water traded, nor 
would KCWA obtain any right to such water beyond the term fixed in the 
contract of sale. The contracts· themselves could and should be clear that 
the trade is of water use fo1· a term of years, and not a transfer of the 
~asic water right. 
The 1980 and 1982 amendments to the Water Code also clarify that 
transferrers of water do not forfeit any rights to the water traded. Water 
Code Section 1011(a) declares that the voluntary conservation of water is a 
reasonable and beneficial use of the water conserved and states that water 
made available as a result of conservation shall not be forfeited. Section 
1011(a) provides: 
When any person entitled to the use of water under an 
appropriative right fails to use all or any part of thP 
water because of water conservation efforts, any cessa-
tion or reduction in the use of such appropriated water 
shall be deemed equivalent to a reasonable beneficial 
use of water to the extent of such CPssation or reduc-
tion in use. No forfeiture of the appropriative right 
to the water conserved shall occur upon the lapse of the 
forfeiture period applicable to water appropriated pur-
suant to the Water Commission Act or this code or the 
forfeiture period app~acable to water appropriated prior 
to December 19, 1914. 
52see p. 46, supra. 
53see p. 39, supra. 
54section lOll{a) provides that. the SWRCB may require vrater rights 
holders who seek to preserve their rights to the water conserved "to file 
periodic reports describing the extent and amount of the reduction in water 
use due to water conservation efforts ••.• Failure to file the reports 
shall deprive the user of water of the benefits of this section. 11 
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This provision is supplemented by Section 1244, which deals 
specifically wit~ transfers of water. Section 1244 declares: 
The sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water 
rights~ in itself, shall not constitute evidence of 
waste or unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, 
or unreasonable method of diversion and shall not affect 
any determination of forfeiture applicable to water 
appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or 
this code or water appropriated prior to 
December 19, 1914. 
Together, the above sections protect TID and ~ID against claims that 
they would forfeit t~eir rights to any water sold to KCWA. As discusse~ 
previously, t he water that would be traded would be water "conserved" 
within the meaning of Section 101l(a), which guarantees that the districts 
would retain their full rights to water made available to KCWA as a result 
of water conservation. 55 And, according to Section 1?44, the trade itself 
may not ccnstitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use of water, nor be 
usee to chal,t~ng~ the districts' rights to the water traded. 
By Sell;ng Water to KCWA, Would TID and MID Assume 
a Permanent Obl;gation to Continue to Sell Water? 
If TID and M1D were to sell water to KCWA, they would not assume a 
permanent obligation to continue to supply water· to the agency. The 
Irrigation District Law specifies that the transferee of surplus water 
supplied by an irrigation district acquires "no right in any water or water 
right owned by the distr1ct." 56 Moreover, the 198? amendments to the Water 
Code require that trans~ers of water be for fixed periods of time only, 
55see p. 5~, supra. 
56water Code Section 22262. 
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generally for seven years or 1ess. 57 ThP clear implication oi thP.se 
provisions is that the trade of surplus water confers no right on the 
transferee to demand such water beyond the term of the contract. 
Pccordingly, the contract for the sale of water from TID or t-'TI" to KCWA 
should be written for a fixed term and could not, consistent with state 
law, be construed as obligating either ~istrict to continue supplying water 
to the agency beyond that term. 
Could Downstream Riparian landowners Claim and Use the Water 
Released into the Tuolumne River for Transmission to KCWA? 
The most efficient method of conveying water from the districts to Y-f\.'A 
would be to allow the water to remain in the Tuolumne River, from which the 
water would flow into the San Joaquin River and on to the Delta, where it 
would be diverted at Clifton Court Forebay and pumped to KCWA through the 
California Aqueduct. 58 It has been suggested that riparian landowners 
along the Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers downstream from the districts 
might be able to claim this augmented flow and thereby negate th~ proposed 
water trade. 
From a theoretical legal perspective, the augmentation of the flow in 
the Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers that would result from the trade of 
water to KCWA is of no consequence, because it would not increase or other-
wise affect the existing rights of downstream riparians. A riparian land-
owner has paramount rights vis-a-vis appropriators and other nom·iparian 
water users to as much of the natural flow of the river as he or she puts 
57water Code Section ?P7; see p. 39, supra. 
5R See p. 23, supra. 
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to reasonoble and bene~icial use. 59 l'nless there has been a statutory 
adjudication limiting the riparian landowner to the amount of water 
historically used, his or her ri~hts are not dependent on the quantity of 
water put to reasonable and beneficial use in the past. That is, he or 
she retains inchoate rights to as much water as may be reasonably and 
beneficially used, which rights may be asserted at any time aga i nst 
f)() 
appropriators and other nonriparian users. Thus ~ all riparians 
downstream of TID an~ ~ID presently have the right to enlarge their u5e of 
water from the Tuolumne and San ~oaquin Rivers and, if necessary to supply 
their increased requirements, to demand from the districts and other 
upstrPam appropriators a greater share of the natural flow of the rivers 
+.har. is presently t'4Vailable to them. Downstream areas do not have such 
rights to ary releases of water from storage under seasonal storage rights. 
The propose~ water trade would affect neither the downstream riparians' 
rights nor the districts' obligations not to interfere with those rights. 
Downstream riparians have the right to demand and take as much of the 
natura l flow of the Tuolumne River as they can put to reasonable and 
beneficial use, regardless of whether the water is consumed by TID and ~JD 
or is allowed to remain in the Tuolumne River for transfer to KCWA. The 
districts' appropriative rights are now subject to these existing and 
inchoate riparian rights and will remain subject to them whether or not the 
5qsee Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District , n7 Cal. ?.d 132 (1967); 
Meridian Ltd. v. Cit and Count of San Francisco, 13 Cal. ?d 4?4 (1939); 
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, ?. Ca ?d 351 1935 . 
Creek Stream S stem, 25 Cal 3d ~39 
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districts sell water to KCWA. In other words, TID ard ~1D would have to 
reduce their present consumption of Tuolumne Piver water, if necessary, to 
fulfill newly asserted demands of downstream riparians for additional 
water. The trade would not alter this obligation nor otherwise affect thP 
rights of downstream riparians. 
Could l onpart;cipat;ng Members of 
TID or MID Object to the Water Trade? 
If either district itself were to enter into the trade pursuant to the 
Irrigation District Law or Water Code Section 383(a),61 me~bers of the 
district potentially could challeng~ the trade on the grounds that the 
district does not possess surplus water and that the trade would, 
therefore, impair the members• rights to water. Tt is unlikely, however, 
that protesting members would prevail on such a claim. As discussed 
previously, both the Irrigation District Law and the Water Code confer 
broad authority on the directors of irrigation districts to determine 
whether surplus water exists and whether to trade such water to users 
outside of the agency.6? Thus, members of TID or ~ID who objected to a 
trade authorized by the district's board of directors would have to prove 
that the board abused its discretion in determining that the district 
possessed water in excess of the present needs of those members. 
If the trade were made between individual members of T:O or MID and 
KCWA pursuant to ~later Code Section 383(b) or (c), nonparticipating members 
61see p. 46, supra. 
62see p. 46, supra (discussing Water Code Sections 383 and 2~ 25~). 
-57-
of the district would have no basis on which to object to the trade. 
Section 383(b) and (c) authorizes individual users within a water agency, 
with the agency's consent, to forego certain quantities of water and to 
trade the water for use outside the agency. 63 Thus, water sold to KCWA 
pursuant to Section 383{b) or (c) would be either water that the district 
had alrecdy allocated to the members participating in the trade or water to 
which the participating members themselves hold appropriative rights. 
Accordingly, nonparticipating members would have no claim to such water. 
Could Adjacent landowners Who Have Relied on Runoff f rom 
Percolation of Water Traded to KCMA Object to the Water Trade? 
One method of structuring the trade would be for individual members of 
TID or MID, with their district's consent, to forego the use of certain 
quantities of water to which they presently are entitled and to have the 
district transfer the water to KCWA. 64 Under this method, surplus 
water would be made available for trade by the participating members' 
(a) reducing their use of water on the land that they now irrigate; 
(b) rotating crops; or (c) allowing presently irrigated land to fallow, or 
by some combination of these measures. If participating members were to 
conserve water for trade to KCWA by one of these means, adjacent landowners 
who have relied on the runoff or percolation of water previously used for 
irrigation and now conserved for trade purposes might complain. 
Specifically, adjacent landowners might claim they have a right to the 
continued use of the runoff from participating members' irrigation 
63 See p. 46, supra. 
64see Parts r, III, and VIIT, supra. 
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practices, either for direct irrigation of their own lands or for recharge 
of the groundwater table. This argument--which essentially is a cl~;m that 
the existing irrigation practices of individual la.ndowners within TID and 
MID could never be altered--would be ill-founded and, therefore, poses no 
problems for the proposed trade. 
Under California law, secondary users of water (i.e., persons who use 
water runoff following use by another) have the right to ~emand the 
continued supply of such runoff, but only if the secondary us~r obtains it 
from the watercourse from which the water originated. 65 Thus, users 
downstream from TID and MID would have the right to prevent the ~istricts 
from changing the point of diversion or place of use of water traded to 
KCWA if the change would impair their use of the return flow from the 
district's present users of the waters of the Tuolumne Rivers. 66 Secondary 
users who obtain and use runoff or return flow from a source other than the 
watercourse-of-origin, however, have no such inviolable rights. They may 
use the runoff as long as it is available to them but have no right to 
prevent the primary user from changing its point of diversion, place of 
use, or methods of irrigation and land management even if such a change 
would diminish or even eliminate the runoff available to them. 
The California Supreme Court has held in analogous cases that importers 
of water (i.e., persons who make water available for use at places other 
than its natural watershed) retain paramount rights to the imported water 
even though others may have relied on the water's availability by using it. 
65water Code Section J.202(d). 
66see p. 18, supra. As discussed in the text 2ust cited, because the 
proposed trade would augment the flow of water to downstream users, their 
rights would not be impaired. _ 
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In Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation District, 67 for example, the district 
diverted water from the Stanislaus River and used it to irrigate lands 
within its boundaries. Some of the water found its way into 
Lone Tree Creek, an adjacent stream, in the form of "seepage, waste, and 
spill ."68 Stevens, a riparian landowner along Lone Tree Creek, had used a 
portion of this augmented flow for ?.2 years. In 1934, however, the 
district constructed a small dam and pump station on Lone Tree Creek and 
began recapturing the runoff from its irrigation practices, thereby 
depriving Stevens of the augmented supply. 69 The Supreme Court rejected 
Stevens• claim that he had acquired a reliance interest in the augmented 
flow of Lone Tree Creek produced by the runof~ from thP district•s lands. 
The court held: 
The producer of an artificial flow is for the most part 
under no obligation to continue to maintain it. At any 
time he may forsa.ke the practice, and lower users will 
not have acquired a right against him, either by 
appropriation or prescription, to the continued augmen-
tation of the stream •..• While rights may be acquired 
by lower proprietors in and to such portions of the 
foreign flow as have been abandoned by the producer and 
thus made available for other use, these rights are 
always subject to the contingency that the supply may be 
intermi ttent or '5Y be terminated entirely at the will 
of the producer. 
67 13 Cal. 2d 343 (1939). 
68Id. at 345. 
69Icl. 
70 Id. at 348. 
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In a passage that is highly pertinent to t he question under cons i deration 
here, the court also observPd: 
One who, by the expenditure of money and labor, diverts 
appropriable water from a stream, and t hus makes i t 
ava i lable for fruitful purposes, is enti t l ed to its 
exclusive control so long as he is abl e and willing t o 
apply it to beneficial uses, and such r i ght extends t o 
what is commonly known as wastage from surface runoff 
!nd.dee~ pe,~olation , necessar ily incident t o practi cal 
1rr1gat1on. 
The Supreme Court affi rmed this principle i n City of Los Ange les v. 
City of Glendale,72 and more recently i n Ci ty of Los Angel es v. City of 
San Fernando.73 In both cases, the court concluded that Los Angeles 
retai ned rights to recapture water t hat i t imported into the San Fernando 
groundwater basin, even after the water had been used by others. The court 
held, therefore, that neighboring cities and water agencies had no cl aim to 
the continued use of the imported wat er once los Angeles decided to 
recapture and use the water fo r its own purposes. 
To summarize, while adjacent landowners have the right to use runoff 
produced by the irrigation of neighboring lands, they have no right t o t he 
continued supply of such water once their neighbor decides to irri gat e or 
to manage its land in a way that reduces or eliminates the runoff. 
Accordingly, landowners adjacent to members of TID or MID who migh t 
participate in the trade of water to KCWA would have no right t o object to 
the trade on the ground that it denies them surface runoff or percol at i on 
on which they have relied for i rrigation of t heir own lands. 
71Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Haga , 276 F. 41 (19?1) ) . 
7?.23 Ca l . 2d 68 (1943). 
7314 Cal. 3d 199 {1975). 
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this study. The trade of water from TID or MID to KCWA would be cons i stent 




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
S ary 
Recent Legislation on Vater Sales, Leases, and Exchanges 
Over the last five years, the Legislature has enacted laws to make it 
easier for holders of water rights to sell, lease, or exchange water. The 
intent of this legislation was that water would be used more efficiently, 
benefiting buyers and sellers, and enhancing the state's economy. In 1979, 
Senator Vuich introduced legislation (Chapter 1112, Statutes of 1979) which 
protects water rights from forfeiture when someone fails to use all or any 
part of the water due to conservation efforts. In 1980, the Legislature 
passed and the Governor signed AB 1147 by Assemblyman Filante (Chapter 933, 
Statutes of 1980), which provides a procedure for temporary and long-term 
transfers of water or water rights. In 1982, Assemblyman Katz, responding 
to the findings of an AOR survey of water rights holders, introduced 
AB 3491 (Chapter 867, Statutes of 1982) which provides greater protection 
and security of water rights when holders sell, lease, or exchange their 
water. 
Unanswered Questions 
The idea that a "free market" system of trading watet· could result in 
more efficient uses of water has been criticized by the Association of 
California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau Federation, the 
California Chamber of Commerce, and the State Department of Water 
Resources. The critiques issued by thesp groups and others made it clear 
that four questions would have to be answered if recent statutory reforms 
are to be fully and effectively implemented: 
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• How muc~ water is available for trade? 
• What hPn~fits might accrue to sellers and buyers? 
• Are water trades physically feasible? 
Are adequate conveyance systems in place and are their 
capacities sufficient? 
How much will the transportation costs add to the cost of the 
transaction? 
1 What legal problems stand in the way of a water trade agreement? 
Study Methods and Activities 
Because the ans~ers to the questions posed above depend on the 
circumstances of a specific water trading agreement, we decided to do 
research on a hypothetical trade between actual water districts. We 
selected two water districts as the "exporters"--the Modesto and Turlock 
Irrigation Districts--and the Kern County Water Agency, consisting of 
21 different member districts, as the "importer ... 
Funds from the Public Service Research and Dissemination Program and 
the California Policy Seminar were used to support research activities 
under the supervision of Dr. Richard Howitt and Dr. Charles Moore at the 




We used the Department of Water Resources• hydrologic-economic model of 
the San Joaquin Valley, which predicts changes in water use and crop 
production as a result of changing economic conditions and water supplies, 
to produce an estimate of the amount of water that could be made availablP 
for trade if both the importing and exporting water districts were to 
maximize their economic gains. The San ~Joaquin Valley Production Model, 
which simulates farming decisions based on actual crop reports, farm 
production costs, and prices received for crops, was used to estimate 
demand functions for water for each study DAU. Each demand equation for 
the seven Kern County DAlls was adjusted to reflect transportation costs. 
The derived demand and supply functions were used to find the 
equilibrium free market price and quantity that satisfied the aggregate 
supply and demand equations. This "optimizing" model generated both the 
quantity of water and the price that each district would have to trade to 
achieve the maximum total economic benefit--the sum of benefits for buyers 
plus sellers. 
The department•s 11 network 11 model, which determines the evaporation 
losses for all channels, canals, and rivers and calculates the losses and 
gains from subsurface flows for all rivers, was used to calculate a set of 
water quantities which could be traded and to c~lculate the associated 
pumping costs. 
The quantities of water and prices paid, calculated as describPd above, 
were then entered into the San Joaquin Production Model to simulate the 
resulting changes in crop production in each of the participating 
districts. 
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Assessing the Legal Constraints on Vater Trading 
Federal law~ state law, and the contracts entered into by local water 
agencies and districts comprise the legal limitation upon any proposed 
sale, lease, or trade of water in California. Existing law recognizes the 
potential complexity of such decisions by providing for temporary trading 
mechanisms whereby such shifts may be examined before contemplating longer 
contractual agreements. Because the legal questions cannot be answered in 
the abstract, we asked Brian Gray of Hastings College of Law to provide a 
detailed analysis of the federal and state statutes, regulations, and 
contractual obligations affecting the hypothetical water trade. 
Conclusions 
Amount of Water to be Traded 
The simulation model revealed that 153,486 acre-feet of water could be 
profitably traded between the selected study districts at a base price of 
$38.78 per acre-foot in the Delta. Despite varying additional 
transportation costs, all importing districts would receive water below the 
price they are currently paying for pumped water. 
Benefits and Economic Feasibility 
Total benefits to the economy would exceed $5.2 million per year if 
water were to he traded from lower valued uses to a higher valued use in an 
area where water is more scarce . Annual net returns to importers and 
PYporters would be $2.4 million and $2.8 million, respectively. Additional 
benefits that were not measured in this study include increases in power 
production in the exporting districts, improved water quality and improved 
habitats for fish and wildlife. 
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Feasibility and Cost of Moving the Vater 
Application of the Surface Water Allocation Model (SWAM) showed that 
water could be physically traded from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation 
Districts to the Kern County districts. 
Changes in Crop Production 
The trade described in this study could be accomplished with minimum 
changes in cropping patterns and total water used in each area. The 
exporting region would reduce irrigated acreage by 8 percent. This 
reduction would take place largely in irrigated pastures, with minimal 
secondary impacts on the local economy, which would be offset by the 
increased local income from the water trade. 
Legal Feasibility 
There are no legal or contractual impediments to thP hypothetical trade 
examined in this report. In some instances~ provisions of state law not 
only permit, but also encourage, this type of trade. 
Recommendations 
This report documents that existing law and regulation~ provide 
protections for water rights holders who decide to voluntarily sell, lease, 
or exchange their water. The report further documents that there are 
substantial benefits to both the buyers ar.d sellers who participate in such 
trades. 
There appear to be few, if any, changes in the law which are needed to 
facilitate such negotiated trade arran9ements between districts. 
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lj'e recommend this report be submitted to each of the hypothetical water 
districts for their critique and review. 
Many of the legislative proposals enacted over the past years ~ay not 
be used at the present time. We strongly recommend the report ~e used to 
stimulate discussions among water districts, the Department of Water 
Resources, and the State Water Resources Control Board to ensure that 
implementation of the legislation is feasible if a district or individual 
decides to include such trade agreements in their water management 
decisions. 
-70-
